[P.110]



9. Land and Work

There is a common Haitian saying which goes: "Ptit manjé, travaille youn pile" (A little food, but tremendous work). This is the way the Haitian peasant sees it. There is endless labor in the fields or in the perpetually eroding mountain gardens, on landholdings that are too small to give any promise of a better life. The rains that give life to the crops take away, year by year, the nourishment of the soil. Where forests or lush groves once grew on the hillsides, there are now deep, dry gullies. Where coffee plants, cotton, and yams once grew abundantly, there are now fields of stones. This is the heritage of the peasant farmer of today. Small holdings on the hillsides and in the valleys have become smaller through the years as the population has swelled and the land been subdivided. Three and a half million people must take their sustenance from that land. More than three hundred persons must share each square mile of soil. But most of Haiti is mountainous and formidable to agriculture. Two-thirds of the land area is untillable by modern standards. There is less than one acre of useful land per person. The best of the land in the alluvial valleys is held by large corporations producing sugar and sisal. Flat, arid stretches elsewhere are semi-desert.

In the small gardens the peasants grow maize, *ti mis* (millet), coffee, bananas and plantains, cotton, beans of various kinds, yams, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, and manioc. In the delta areas they grow rice, and along the long coastline thousands of fishermen sail out in crude but sturdy boats to bring back fish fom the sea. Citrus trees, mango trees, and avocado trees grow wild; but they are fewer than in the old days. The Haitian works the soil and manages to subsist, but nature and history have not been kind to him.

Even less kind have been some of the chroniclers of the past, who have sought to disparage the Haitian as a lazy and careless creature who would

H. Courlander 8-6 (1937-1938) 1960 HV3 Haiti HV3

rather starve than work. An Englishman, James Franklin, wrote in 1828, for example:

> Experiments may be tried, laws may be enacted, and encouragement given, but nothing short of coercion and want will impel the Haytian to labour; and I have my doubts as to the practicability of enforcing labour in Hayti until the people have been better instructed, and their characters become changed.

As Franklin summarized it: "Nature is too generous to the Haytian; he never wants, and so never works for hire, as do free labourers in other countries."[1]

The early nineteenth century saw a flood of such bitter comments about the remains of the once rich and flourishing French colony of St. Domingue. The vast productivity of Haiti under French rule had made that colony one of the richest in the New World. The country was dotted with sugar mills, brick-covered wells, and warehouses; and carefully built brick aqueducts, irrigation canals, locks, and dams assured water for the plantations. In 1790, under the slave system, Haiti had exported 163,000,000 pounds of sugar. In 1826, a quarter of a century after the revolution, it was reported to have exported 33,000 pounds.

This falling off in production and exports doubtless had many causes, but one of the most significant was the Haitian's revolt not only against slavery but also against continuing the same kind of work he had *performed as a slave. He saw not too much difference between forced,* unpaid labor and working for any large landholder at subsistence wages. To the Haitian slave the inspiring battle cry of the French Revolution did not mean that all men would work together on another's man plantation and receive the same wages. It meant that every man would have his own garden to work for himself as he chose; every man would be a full citizen, with land of his own, free to come and go, to plant what he wished, to sell what he could. Despite long years under a colonial slave system, the Haitian still remembered a different way of life in Africa, where mass production for export was not the primary objective of labor.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Haiti was not much more than half a million—less than one sixth of what it is today. There was plenty of land, and much of it had not yet been wasted by constant tilling and erosion. When the French were driven out, the Haitian peasant re-created an economic world of his own liking. The plantation system which had poured out sugar and coffee and indigo for Europe faded away, and in its place there sprang up an agrarian system which has continued until the present day. In the early

[1] [Franklin, The Present State of Hayti, P. 362. Cf. P. 351, category 116. -- Analyst].

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

Nor is it sufficient to label *Duvalierisme* "pathological" or "paranoid." The roots of this ideology are to be found in Haiti, not elsewhere; its supporters are the product of Haitian times and ideas; and their social identity, while not entirely clear, would probably pose few enigmas if enough data were available.* In order to make clear these assertions, however, it is necessary to look again at Haitian society, the Haitian society Leyburn has described so well, and to reexamine the terms that have been used by him and by others to describe it.

Though the societies of the Caribbean Sea differ significantly from each other, many of them share certain general historical experiences. Unlike the colonial areas of the Old World, these islands were largely populated from abroad, and in this regard they resemble the Atlantic lowland areas of mainland America. However, the colonial history of the islands meant that they would long remain the instruments of policy formulated in foreign capitals. Jamaica, Puerto Rico, and other islands were, during most of their postconquest history, the outposts of far-flung colonial empires, and the design of their societies was conditioned by this dependence and subjugation. As "plantation islands," their agriculture, demography, mode of settlement, and social structure were attuned to metropolitan needs and objectives. Unlike most of Africa and Asia, the Antilles lost their native populations almost entirely, owing to enslavement, overwork, disease, and war, early in the era of conquest and settlement. There remained the vestiges of native traditions, assimilated into the new, growing cultures of the postconquest period. The Indians themselves, wherever they were able to survive, were also assimilated through interbreeding with Old World migrants.

The newcomers came from Europe, Africa, and Asia, bringing with them what they could of their ancestral traditions, but never able to transfer their social heritages as intact bodies of belief and behavior. Hence the cultures of the new Caribbean societies were built up out of elements originating in many different places, while their social forms took shape under conditions of colonial control. The peoples of the islands were able to maintain some continuities with

* One interpreter of the Haitian political scene (Bastien, 1960:143–48) has suggested that Leyburn's analysis of Haitian society as a "two-caste" system greatly influenced local political thinking by strengthening one idea: "the black intellectual must regain political power for the benefit of the country's majority."

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

same century in which Haiti withdrew. The yeomanry of Haiti in the nineteenth century was hence able to develop a traditionalism of unusual firmness and persistence.

This traditionalism, however, has had a high price. The economic productivity of the rural cultivator has not risen; it can be argued convincingly that poor land use, erosion, and population growth have meant lower levels of consumption for the common people in 1966 than obtained a hundred years or more ago. The rural masses, though overwhelmingly consisting of landholders, have been unable to break out of a stagnation that is economic as well as cultural. Such stasis has been based to some extent on the limited responsiveness of the rural folk to outside stimulus. But also important in maintaining the past is the national institutional system that took on its characteristic shape after 1804, and under which the rural masses still live. That system, the origins of which Leyburn has examined and assessed with such care, is controlled, as we have seen, by a numerically small segment of the national population that is markedly distinct from the yeomanry itself.

The nature and internal differentiation of the elite needs much more study, though it seems clear already that it is by no means a single solidary class embracing all but the yeomen. Whatever the structure of the elite, the relationship between the yeomen on the one hand and the real holders of power on the other must be understood if one is to understand Haiti. The yeoman is defined in terms of the elite; he is dependent upon it and subject to it. This is what is meant when it is said that the yeomanry, like the elite, forms only a part-society. Yet without the yeomen, there would be no elite. The elite live by controlling and taxing the rural masses, and find their sustenance and their power in rural productivity. Elite and yeomen, then, are bound together in unequal but interdependent relationships in Haiti as they are in other less developed societies of a similar kind. In such cases, the political role of the yeomanry is usually minor, and few opportunities may arise for the expansion of its political strength. If the yeomanry fails to increase its productivity in ways that enable it to control more of its own surpluses, its role in affecting national political decisions may grow narrower rather than wider, and this ominous possibility has become a worldwide phenomenon. It becomes more intensified wherever industry and trade grow, unaccompanied by parallel growth in yeoman productivity or in new and more widely representative national institutions.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

I

THE PEOPLE AND THEIR COUNTRY

IN the ten thousand square miles of Haiti's mountains and valleys more than two and a half million people—some say more than three million—are crowded together. Some are black, some light-skinned, but less than five thousand are white, and these are almost all recent immigrants to the country. Modern Haiti has its racial roots primarily in Africa, but its social roots lie as much in Europe as in Africa; if it is "American" at all, geography and a few fairly superficial characteristics are the only American qualities it displays.

Carrying our own cultural interpretations with us when we visit our Caribbean neighbor, we are likely to misunderstand what we see in Haiti, for it is very easy to think of all colored people in terms of our own. To do so is to remain completely ignorant of Haiti. Whereas in the United States we use "Negro" and "colored" indiscriminately as synonyms, making a real distinction only between "black" and "mulatto," all four terms are taboo in polite society in Haiti. A new descriptive vocabulary, an entirely new frame of reference, must be acquired by the friendly foreign visitor to this West Indian republic.[1]

Probably the most striking phenomenon in the country is its division into two social groups. So rigidly are the class lines set that

1. No greater error of tact can be made by visitors to Haiti than to use such commonly accepted American terms as Negro, colored, mulatto, blacks, Africans. Whereas in the United States such words are employed to describe people with a greater or less degree of Negro blood, in Haiti they are generally regarded as opprobrious epithets, emphasizing the color of the epidermis as all important, while ignoring the essential matters of culture, standard of living, and social background. Not many Haitians would have the grace to reply, as President Pétion suggested to a subaltern who was incensed at a white man for calling him "un nègre," "Why, then, did you not call him 'un blanc'?" Probably the most offensive of all the terms is *mulâtre*, for it calls attention to miscegenation in the family. The educated people in general regard themselves as darker Frenchmen, not as transplanted Africans. Books about Haiti which refer to the "black republic" seem to them to ignore the important fact that the blacks, though numerically preponderant, do not rule. The visitor must accordingly acquire a new vocabulary of color. It is safer not to make any allusion at all to the matter; but if occasion demands, one speaks of "jaune" and "brun," not white and black.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

tiny communities, some of them designating "villages" of only four or five houses. For numbers of peasants hidden away in the valleys or on mountain farms, the only contact with the larger world comes through visits to the nearest market town—which itself may count only a thousand souls. The peasant is thus effectively isolated. The American Financial Adviser to the Government has estimated the average *annual* income of the Haitian at $20 a head.[8] The smallness of the sum limits the material contacts of the peasant with the outside world. Rural schools are few,[9] consequently all but a small percentage of the rising generation is growing up illiterate. Lack of mental stimulus completes the isolation. Bound to the soil by the need of wresting a livelihood from rocky, gullied, and increasingly unproductive land, harassed by ill-health, and governed by a group whose own security would be threatened by improving his lot, it is little wonder that the peasant is unprogressive, or that he struggles along at a bare subsistence level.[10]

Haiti is rural and agricultural, then, with a population density of about 250 per square mile. The people, living without machine industry and with very little foreign trade, must get their living from 10,000 square miles, not of lush tropical soil but of rocky, mountainous country which, after a century and a half of poor farming, has been stripped of most of its forests and much of its topsoil.

A glance at a relief map of the West Indies would show clearly that the islands are the tops of a mountain range, whose lowlands were long since submerged by the Caribbean Sea. Looked at from above, Haiti seems a jumbled mass of mountains running in all directions.[11] Down their slopes flow many small streams which after

8. Dr. W. W. Cumberland, cited by Paul H. Douglas, "The American Occupation of Haiti," *Political Science Quarterly*, XLII (1927), 258.

9. The average monthly salary of $13 (until recently only $6) for rural schoolteachers would not draw many wide-awake young men, even if schoolhouses existed for classes. The salary, indeed, is so small that only inferior persons are attracted, often men who know little more than their pupils. See chap. XV, 3.

10. Mrs. Blair Niles, in *Black Haiti* (New York, 1926), pp. 185–186, tells of a prisoner who preferred to remain in jail rather than be freed. "'When he gets out,'" she quotes the officer as saying, "'he'll be in again. You'll see. Here he gets nine cents a day for food, an' that's more than the average Haitian ever has.'"

11. One can well believe the story (told by Ebenezer D. Bassett, *Haiti* [Washington, 1893], p. 3) of the English admiral who, asked by George III for a description of the island, crumpled a sheet of paper, threw it on the table, and said: "Sire, Haiti looks like that." The same tale is told of Puerto Rico, with a Spanish admiral speaking to Queen Isabella.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

not find herself constantly embroiled with European states and American financial interests. The Haitian debt was funded, and a financial adviser remained in the country even after the Occupation came to an end. It is expected that by 1943 the last debt will be paid; the financial adviser, however, withdrew in 1941. Since the Occupation, although the republic has been free to manage her own affairs, she has consulted frequently with the State Department in Washington.

Nineteen years of occupation ended the century of Haitian isolation. The Americans built roads, conducted health campaigns, made their presence felt even in remote hamlets and valleys. American authors, political, romantic, and sensational, discovered the Antillean republic. Steamship companies stopped their cruises for a few hours at Cap-Haïtien to allow tourists to visit the Citadel, and at Port-au-Prince to see the sights of the capital. Every Haitian now realizes that there is a world outside.

Whatever crises have arisen in Haitian affairs, certain problems have persisted. For whom do they constitute a source of worry? Since the government has always been a dictatorship, limited or absolute, subject to no party control, the incumbents of office have never had the experience of being constantly reminded by their opponents of the misery or daily worries of the population. After a hundred years the people have learned that relief is not to be expected from politicians. Occasionally a dramatic revolutionary leader has persuaded some of the people that the officials in power were responsible for their distress, and so worked up a following; yet even when such movements succeeded, the masses never benefited. To most governments of the past century Haiti's problem has been only one: to frustrate insurrection. There is evidence that recent administrations have busied themselves assiduously with the country's internal problems, although none of them has been adequately solved. The élite, at least as a group, do not feel any apparent responsibility for the maladjustments, nor obligation to effect the necessary reforms. A few patriots, and those almost without exception not in office, know what ails the country and say so; a smaller number propose reasonable solutions. The problems remain. Of these the three outstanding are overpopulation with all its accompanying ills, health, and education.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

1. *Overpopulation*

Two and a half or possibly three million people live within 10,200 square miles. These figures, if they are to convey a reality, must be conceived in more familiar terms. Haiti is just about the size of Vermont, but has six times as many people crowded together among its mountains In a list of countries still independent in 1935 Haiti ranked among the first ten in density of population, yet its economic life was agricultural, while the other nine have a high degree of industrialization.

As one looks at a full-page map of the Western Hemisphere it is difficult even to find the tiny wisp of color which marks the Caribbean republic of Haiti. Of the twenty-two American countries, including Canada, Haiti is next to last in size (El Salvador is smaller), yet ranks thirteenth in population, and far and away the first in *density* of population, in the whole hemisphere. The figures are revealing:

Country	*Population*	*Area in Square Miles*	*Density*
1. United States	131,669,275	3,026,701	43.5
2. Brazil	43,246,931	3,275,510	13.2
3. Mexico	19,478,791	763,944	25.5
4. Argentina	12,762,000	1,078,278	11.7
5. Canada	11,012,724	3,694,863	2.9
6. Colombia	8,730,000	448,794	19.4
7. Peru	6,600,000	532,184	12.3
8. Chile	4,626,508	296,717	15.6
9. Cuba	4,108,650	41,164	99.8
10. Venezuela	3,451,677	352,051	9.8
11. Bolivia	3,426,296	537,792	6.3
12. Guatemala	3,044,490	45,452	67.0
13. Haiti	3,000,000	10,204	294.9

Haiti's density per square mile is therefore greater than that of China or India—two world examples of overpopulation—and even greater than that of New York State, with its enormous city areas. Haiti's largest town has a population of 100,000; there are seven towns ranging from 7,500 to 20,000. The density of distribution through the countryside is therefore evident.

Beside the figures given above must be set those of the government

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

Besides the figures given above must be set there of the government

budget, which is annually in the neighborhood of $7,000,000, and of its annual imports and exports, neither of which generally exceeds $10,000,000 a year. Chicago, with its population of three million, has an annual budget of about $275,000,000, aside from state and federal services.

To care for all the needs of three million people in Haiti there is a sum of money less than that available annually to several of our American universities. Out of the seven million dollars must come all salaries of officials, legislators, judges, policemen, schoolteachers; the wages of all janitors and day laborers employed by the government; the upkeep of all schools, roads, lighthouses, experiment stations; the maintenance of such important public services as health, sanitation, education, soil development, reforestation. Since there are few towns, practically every improvement which takes place must be paid for by the central government.

Haiti's growth in population is not a new thing. It has been increasing steadily since 1804 while the soil of the country was being worn out and foreign trade grew stagnant. The country is entirely agricultural, there being absolutely no manufacturing industry worth the name. The people consequently live upon a subsistence economy. The soil is still fertile enough to preserve life in the teeming population, though undernourishment is general. Most of the people have no "artificial" wants and could not satisfy them under present conditions even if they had.

Assuming the census of Dessalines in 1805 to be even approximately accurate, the population is now eight times what it was then. The working of the Law of Population[3] is implacable: if population increases while economic efficiency remains static or declines, either there will be an increasing death rate or the standard of living must sink—or both. In the case of Haiti, economic efficiency is certainly not what it was under the forced-labor system of Dessalines: the death rate has been continuously high; it is the standard of living which has suffered.

To grasp the import of Haiti's problem of overpopulation one

3. "Population tends to increase up to the limit of the supporting power of the land, relative to the economic efficiency and to the standard of living of the people at the time." (For an amplification of this discussion on overpopulation, see the note on p. 320.) The law of population as stated here is a modification of that given by Sumner and Keller, *The Science of Society*, I, 46; their statement, in turn, is that of Malthus with the added cultural items of economic efficiency and the standard of living.

To grasp the impact of Haiti's problem of
270 over- population one

THE HAITIAN PEOPLE

161 should imagine the number of Vermonters sextupled, working with
433 hand tools and using methods which their great-grandfathers would
171 have considered antiquated; imagine the state with only a hundred
511 miles of paved roads, with no harnessed water power, no substantial fortunes, no middle class; imagine the farms gullied and worn out; ninety-five per cent of the people illiterate and undernourished; the state having no industry and practically no goods imported from New York, Massachusetts, or any other part of the United States. Under such conditions the low standard of living would be readily understandable.

Haiti might also be compared with Mississippi. Less than a quarter the size of that American state, itnevertheless has a larger population. Both Haiti and Mississippi are agricultural, with few towns, although no part of Haiti now has land as richly fertile as that of the Yazoo Delta. The low standard of living of the Mississippi share-cropper, whether Negro or white, is notorious—yet he has access to a few of the perquisites of civilization, whether these be elementary schools or moving pictures; the Haitian peasant lacks even these. In America the undercurrent of feeling is that something should be, probably eventually will be, done to improve the lot of the share-cropper. Certainly there is wealth enough in the country at large to alleviate conditions where they are deemed to be socially unhealthy. Not so in Haiti: the land is poorer, the numbers even greater, the area much smaller; and there is no wealth in the country, nor enough social vision among the upper classes to deal with the relentless increase of numbers.

168 How conceivably might this problem be dealt with? The first answer which would occur to many Americans, namely, birth control, is out of the question at present. Expense would stand in the way of its use by people who hardly ever see money; the peasants, unable to read, suspicious of new-fangled ways, untouched by all efforts to "uplift" them, and with no educational agencies, could [795] hardly be converted to the use of contraceptives; while the Catholic Church, which until now has not had to raise its voice against birth control in Haiti, would fight any proposal to introduce it as it fought the campaign in Puerto Rico.

167 Another possible answer is migration. This solution many Haitians
C48 have tried without prompting. With little money available for

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

travel, the peasants are limited in their migrations to near-by countries; specifically Cuba, which can be reached by sailing vessels, and the Dominican Republic. For many years there was a seasonal migration from Haiti to each of these neighboring countries, where wages on the sugar plantations, although low, have been better than nothing. Native Cubans and Dominicans, however, have quite understandably resented the influx of cheap labor which throws them out of work, depresses the wage scale, and thwarts efforts to improve working conditions; as the tide of Haitian immigration to the two adjacent countries increased during the 'twenties and the depression period of the 'thirties, resentment flamed into action. Murders occurred; ships to Cuba were not allowed to land; workmen were beaten and otherwise persecuted. In 1937 the Cuban dictator, Batista, expelled thousands of Haitians from the island. But the climax was reached in the autumn of the same year when the news gradually leaked out that in the Dominican Republic thousands of Haitians had been murdered in cold blood. It was estimated at that time that as many as 60,000 Haitians were living across the border; of these, certainly as many as 5,000 were butchered or drowned, and it is likely that 20,000 would be a more accurate figure if the whole truth were known.[4] In the world at the present time there seems to be no haven for penniless migrants, particularly illiterate blacks.

Even if Haiti could devise within her tiny budget a way to finance a whole series of public works, the problem of overpopulation would not be solved. Expenditures for internal improvements would merely lessen unemployment for the time being; it would not prevent the people from having large families of undernourished children.

It is easy enough to say that the problem of overpopulation could be solved by a combination of birth control, education, improvement of the soil and of agricultural techniques, introduction of manufacture, and public works projects. Each of these "solutions" is a major problem in itself, considering the limitations of the country.

4. This massacre was protested with all diplomatic vigor by Haiti. The gendarmerie, since the American Occupation the only military force in the country, numbered only 2,500 men and was no match for the military power of the Dominican Republic, so that diplomatic protest to the American nations was the only course open to President Vincent. A joint committee of the United States, Mexico, and Cuba investigated and awarded Haiti damages of $750,000, of which the Dominican government (meaning Trujillo) immediately paid $250,000, promising the rest in installments.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

of Lafitte in Paris to find even the interest for payments due to the French government.

4. Exports from Haiti

Sugar was the great crop of French colonial days in Saint-Domingue, with coffee, indigo, and cotton lucrative secondary crops. The first table shows the rapid decline of sugar, indigo, and cotton between 1791 and 1839, near the end of Boyer's administration.

CROPS

	Sugar	*Indigo*	*Cotton*
1791 (colony)	163,405,220 lbs.	930,016 lbs.	6,286,126 lbs.
1802 (Toussaint)	53,400,000	37,600	4,050,000
1804 (Dessalines)	47,600,000	35,400	3,000,000
1818 (Pétion)	1,896,449	0	384,001
1825 (Boyer)	2,020	0	815,697
1839 (Boyer)	6,000	0	1,402,792

By contrast coffee production, although it declined, remained large enough to provide the state with some income. After 1810 it was the principal crop of the country.

Coffee Production

1791	68,151,180 lbs.	1818	20,280,589 lbs.
1802	34,370,000	1825	36,034,300
1804	31,000,000	1839	43,854,666

In 1935–36 the Vincent government reported the export of 76,600,000 pounds of sugar, 79,400,000 pounds of coffee, and 12,700,000 pounds of cotton.[11]

CHAPTER XV

What Haiti faces, economically and socially, can be seen in terms of the law of population: "Population tends to increase up to the limit of the supporting power of the land, relative to the economic efficiency and to the standard of living of the people at the time." This law may be better visualized by stating it in forms of an equation:

$$\frac{\text{Population}}{\text{Productivity of land}} = \frac{\text{Economic Efficiency}}{\text{Standard of Living}}$$

Another way of stating the law is this:

Population + Standard of Living = Productivity of Land + Economic Effi-

11. These tables are compiled from material in Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Description . . . de . . . Saint-Domingue, passim;* Great Britain Foreign Office, *Communications Relative to Hayti* (London, 1825), p. 159; Charles Mackenzie, *Notes on Hayti*, II, 172 ff.; Aléxandre Bonneau, *Haïti: ses progrès, son avenir* (Paris, 1862), pp. 35, 36; John Candler, *Brief Notices of Hayti*, p. 105; L.-J. Marcelin, *Haïti: ses guerres civiles* (Paris, 1892), p. 32; Charles F. Pressoir, "Pages de géographie économique," *Revue de la Société d'Histoire*, III, vi, 18; James Franklin, *The Present State of Hayti*, pp. 318 ff.; *Rapport annuel du représentant fiscal d'Haïti*, October, 1935–September, 1936, pp. 189–195.

3: Leyburn Z-4, 5 (no date) 1966
SV3 Haiti SV3

161
433

ciency. It is immediately evident that no one of the four variables can be increased or lowered without disturbing the balance.

In French colonial times, the white and colored population was but 68,000. This figure excludes all the Negro slaves. The land was highly productive. Economic efficiency was likewise high. Now, after a century and a half, the population is near 3,000,000, the land is wearing out, and economic efficiency is almost a negative quantity. The standard of living has obviously suffered tremendously as compared with that of the French planters and free colored people of colonial times. Even if it be protested that the comparison should rather be between early and modern Haitians than between upper-caste colonials and modern Haitians, we should still compare a population of 380,000 with one of 3,000,000 on just about the same amount of land, for what has been taken up by clearing away forests has been compensated for by erosion and reversion to waste. And as has been said economic efficiency has deteriorated.

If, then, the standard of living—the usual test of a people's prosperity and contentment—is to be raised, Haiti must:

a. Lower the birth rate, and so work on its population.

b. Rebuild and fertilize its soil (that is, improve its land).

c. Adopt machinery, learn scientific methods, apply intelligent management.

All three must be done seriatim or in combination. To foreigners, particularly to visitors from the United States, there is a moral imperative in the Haitian situation, a feeling that something ought to be done, and that right early. To Haitian peasants, on the other hand, "progress" would mean change, and change is an uncomfortable interruption of the familiar. Knowing this attitude, the Haitian government is not goaded into action.